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Union Raiding and Organizing
in Ontario 
TIMOTHY J. B ARTKIW
FELICE MARTINELLO
This paper provides the first analysis of aggregate raiding 
activity in Ontario by isolating raid applications from available 
certification data. Raiding in Ontario generally decreased over the 
1975 to 2003 period save for the huge increases in 2000 and 2001 
involving the CAW and SEIU. Bargaining units are significantly
larger in raids, and legislative changes had little effect on aggregate 
raiding levels. Over most of the period raiding activity has been 
quite modest. Thus analyses of union organizing and its effect on 
union density are unlikely to be affected by leaving raids in the 
organizing data. An important exception occurs in 2000 and 2001, 
where the certification data seriously overstate new organizing. 
Corrected measures show that new (non-raid) union organizing 
continues to decline in Ontario. The decline in new organizing has 
been greater than the decline in raiding, resulting in an increased 
proportion of organizing due to raids in recent years. 
Unions sometimes try to organize workers who are already repre-
sented by another union. This activity, popularly referred to as raiding, 
is  important for at least three reasons. First, it is controversial and often 
attracts  negative attention from the media since it pits one union against 
another. The public perception of unions is important because it affects 
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unions’ ability to  function effectively for their members and to organize 
new workers. Second, raiding activity employs scarce union resources that 
could have been used for other purposes; for example, organizing workers 
who are not already represented by a union, servicing the union’s existing 
membership, or even returning those resources to members in terms of 
lower dues payments. The third reason is addressed in this paper; namely, 
that raiding activity obscures the amount of union organizing that is
directed towards unorganized  workers. Thus it is difficult to know 
how many new  workers or bargaining units are actually being added to
unions’ ranks through  organizing, and their subsequent effects on union 
density.
Given the effects noted above, it is important to know how much 
 raiding activity is occurring. Unfortunately only two Canadian jurisdic-
tions, the Federal and British Columbia, report any data on the levels of 
raiding  activity and success. This paper ameliorates this deficiency for 
Canada’s largest jurisdiction, Ontario, by devising a method for identify-
ing the amounts of raiding activity and success from data published in the 
monthly reports of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB). We report 
on the number of raid applications that proceeded to a representation vote, 
the number that were granted, and the number of employees covered in the 
 successful campaigns in Ontario, monthly, from April 1975 to November 
2003. We show that the levels of raiding activity and success have been 
fairly modest and declining slightly over the period, with the notable 
exception of an explosion of activity in 2000 and 2001 resulting from the 
Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) takeover of several locals of the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU). 
Earlier work on union organizing activity and success in Ontario (see, 
for example, Martinello, 2000, and Johnson, 2002a and 2002b) has used 
published OLRB sources to estimate the effects of labour legislation, the 
political environment and economic conditions on organizing activity and 
success and has extended the analysis to consider the impacts upon and 
possible future trends of union density.1 Unfortunately, the published OLRB 
data do not differentiate between raid and non-raid organizing campaigns. 
Thus, the data overstate the amount of organizing directed at unorganized 
employees and the inflow of new workers into union membership through 
certifications. The analyses in the literature usually noted this problem 
with raiding activity but could do nothing to correct it, given the data 
1. Johnson (2002a) and (2002b) actually studies the sum of the provincial and federal 
jurisdictions (save PEI) in her analysis. But Ontario is included in her work and it is, by 
far, the largest jurisdiction. 
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available at the time.2 This paper addresses this problem by subtracting the 
new  measures of raiding activity from the certification data published in 
the OLRB Reports and reporting the levels of organizing activity directed 
at previously unorganized workers. Specifically, we report the number of 
certification applications granted and dismissed, the number granted, and 
the number of employees covered in certifications granted for only those 
organizing campaigns directed at workers not already represented by a 
union.
In addition we present a short summary and history of the legislation 
that governs raiding. Regression analysis is used to investigate how the 
absolute levels of raiding activity and the ratios of raiding to non-raiding 
organizing activity changed over time and in response to changes in the 
legal and political framework in Ontario over the period of the sample. 
Most of the literature on union raiding deals with the United States.3
Martinello, Hanrahan, Kushner, and Masse (2003) provide a very brief 
 summary of the US literature. For Canada, Riddell (2002) presents an analysis 
of raid applications in British Columbia, and Martinello et al. (2003) examine 
the relationship between raids and firm performance in the Ontario, British 
Columbia and Federal jurisdictions. There are a few Canadian studies focusing 
on raiding activities of specific unions, including Stocks’ (1985) analysis of 
raiding among British Columbia’s major mining, smelting and metal industry 
unions in the 1970’s and Roberge’s (1969) analysis of raiding and rivalry in 
Quebec. Perlmutter (2004) reports on the organizing and raiding  activities 
of the CAW and a comparison group of seven other unions in Ontario for 
the period 1998 to March 2003 and Gilson and Spencer’s (1987) review 
of 14 unions reveals that, on average, raids and mergers tended to involve 
much larger groups of workers than average certification drives pertaining 
to previously unorganized workers. Other qualitative studies provide some 
limited evidence concerning union leaders’ perceptions of raiding dynamics 
and case studies (Kumar and Ryan, 1988). To our knowledge, there is no 
previous analysis of aggregate raiding activity in Ontario.
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF RAID ACTIVITY IN ONTARIO
The OLRB refers to raids as displacement applications and they 
are essentially applications for certification where an incumbent union 
2. Bartkiw (2005) is an exception. Slinn (2003) also performs certain data “cleaning” in 
an attempt to remove raid files, but her correction process also removes cases involving 
more than one bargaining unit and/or more than one representation vote.
3. See, for example, Krislov (1954) and (1955), Chaison (1973) and (1976), Odewahn and 
Scott (1989), and Troy (1960). 
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already holds bargaining rights to the bargaining unit in question. Thus 
raid  applications must meet all of the normal requirements of certification 
applications, with the most important being that the applicant (raiding) 
union must establish that it has sufficient support amongst employees in the 
bargaining unit by disclosing such membership evidence to the Board. 
In addition, other requirements are imposed on raid applications. One 
concerns the timing of applications. The specific rules are complex but, in 
general, a raid application can only be filed in the following periods: 4
1. at least one year after the original certification5 if there is no collective 
agreement, work stoppage, or conciliation in place; or 
2. at least 30 days after the completion of the conciliation process,6
3. at least six months after the start of a lawful strike,7 or 
4. where a collective agreement is in place, during an “open period” 
which is generally towards the end of the collective agreement. At 
the time of writing, the open period is the last 3 months of the term of 
the collective agreement. For collective agreements longer than three 
years, the open period is the 3-month period before the third and every 
subsequent anniversary date of the collective agreement. 
Another requirement on raid applications is that, in practice, the 
Board has always ordered a representation vote, even during periods when 
 automatic certification was available in normal certification applications.8
The only choices on the ballot are the applicant union and the incumbent 
union, and the majority of votes cast decides the issue. Unlike in the United 
States, there is no option for ‘no union’ on the ballot, so a raid application 
is not transformed into an application for the termination of bargaining 
rights.9
4. See Sack and Mitchell (1997-), pp. 3.231.3 – 3.269.
5. If there is a bona fide voluntary recognition agreement instead, the raid application may 
only be filed one year after the signing of the agreement. 
6. For the full set of restrictions on timing in relation to the conciliation process, see 
 subsections 67(1) and 67(2) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1.
7. For the full set of restrictions on timing in relation to lawful strikes, see subsection 67(3) 
of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1.
8. Canadian John Wood Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 46 ¶ 16,449; Evans Lumber and Builders 
Supply Ltd., 58 CLLC ¶ 18,117; Thomas Fuller Construction Co. (1958) Ltd., [1963] 
OLRB Rep., May 108; York Board of Education, [1988] OLRB Rep., Jan. 106. 
9. See J. Sack and M. Mitchell, supra, p. 3.31. See also Campeau Corp. Ltd., [1972] OLRB 
Rep. Feb 167; Laura Secord, [1980] OLRB Rep. Mar. 334. 
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Other Canadian jurisdictions generally treat raid applications in a 
 similar manner. Raid applications must meet all of the requirements apply-
ing to certification applications in that jurisdiction but the applications may 
only be filed in specified time periods. The timing rules are complex and the 
specific definition of the open period varies across every jurisdiction. What 
is common is that each jurisdiction restricts raids for some time following 
the initial certification or voluntary recognition, and each typically also 
restricts raids during the term of existing collective agreements to specific 
intervals of approximately 1–3 months. 
Since raid applications are treated as certification applications, changes 
in certification procedures affect raids. From July of 1975 to December 1992 
there were no significant changes to certification procedures in Ontario 
outside of the construction industry. The only possible exception is the 
introduction of First Contract Arbitration in May of 1986 which changed 
some of the timing rules for a small subset of raid applications falling around 
the time of First Contract Arbitration applications, but this is unlikely to 
have had any significant effect on raid activity.10
Several significant changes to the rules for certifications came into force 
in January of 1993 under the NDP government’s Bill 40.11 These included a 
reduction in the minimum level of support from 45% to 40% of the bargain-
ing unit, extending coverage to employees who were previously excluded 
from union representation, changes in the Board’s reaction to unfair labour 
practices, and increased access to third party property for organizing. 
In November of 1995, the last three changes listed in the  previous 
 paragraph were reversed by the Progressive Conservative’s Bill 7 
 legislation.12 Bill 7 also extended the ban on unions re-applying for 
 certification after a failed or withdrawn application to one year. Finally, Bill 
7 made representation votes mandatory in every application, but this would 
have had no direct effect on raids since votes were already  (effectively) 
mandatory.13
In late December of 2000, Bill 139 came into effect in Ontario and it 
brought two further changes.14 First, the one-year ban on organizing after 
10. S.O. 1986, c. 17.
11. S.O. 1992, c. 21.
12. See Labour Relations Act, 1995, Sch. A., S.O. 1995, c. 1.
13. Bill 40 and Bill 7 also changed the timing rules that apply when there is an application 
for first contract arbitration and when there is voluntary recognition and/or a voluntary 
recognition agreement. Both of these events are fairly rare, however, so the changes 
are unlikely to have had a significant effect. 
14. Labour Relations Amendment Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 38.
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a failed or withdrawn certification application was extended to all unions. 
Second, the open period within collective agreements was extended from 
two months to three months.
Changes in the labour legislation covering the construction industry 
also affected the rules governing raid applications. In 1977, collective 
 bargaining in the large Industrial, Commercial and Institutional (ICI) sector 
was coordinated so that all organized employees were covered by province 
wide collective agreements which expired biannually, starting from April 
30, 1978.15 As a result, the open period for raids occurred at the same time 
for all bargaining units: namely, March and April of every second year. 
The 1977 legislation also placed some restrictions on which unions could 
represent which workers (based mainly on historical craft boundaries) 
thereby limiting the pool of potential raiding unions.16
The province wide agreements in the ICI sector were extended to a 
three-year duration in 1991, so they would expire triennially from April 
30, 1992.17 As a result, the open periods contracted from two months every 
two years to two months every three years after April 30, 1992.18 In 2000, 
Bill 69 imposed a new requirement that all collective agreements in the 
residential sector of the construction industry would expire according to the 
same schedule as the ICI sector.19 This created a common open period for 
these two sectors within the construction industry. Also in 2000, as noted 
above, Bill 139 extended the open period in every collective agreement 
from two to three months. 20
DATA
The data are collected from the results of every certification application 
published in the formerly monthly, but now bimonthly, Ontario Labour 
Relations Board Reports over the period April 1975 to November 2003. 
The OLRB data does not identify the raid certification applications directly. 
However the published descriptions of the outcomes allow us to determine 
15. S.O. 1977, c. 31, s. 3. 
16. There is also some provision enabling construction unions that are not included in the 
provincial designation scheme (such as the Christian Labourers Association of Canada) 
to certify employees in that sector. See s. 158 (4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.
See also Clifford Restoration Ltd. [1999] OLRB Rep. Jan/Feb 4.
17. S.O. 1991, c. 56.
18. S.O. 1991, c. 56, s. 2.
19. Labour Relations Amendment Act (Construction Industry), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 24.
20. Supra, note 10. 
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which applications were raids. A certification application listing in the 
Reports is a raid if it meets the following three conditions: 
1. The decision lists another union as an intervener in the application. In 
raid applications, the incumbent union is always listed as an intervener 
and in some cases, the vote results actually refer to the intervener union 
as the incumbent union. 
2. A representation vote was held.
3. The results of the representation vote show that the employees had the 
option of voting for the applicant union or the intervener union, but 
the employees did not have the option of voting for ‘no union’. 
Since a vote was always held in displacement applications, requiring 
evidence of a representation vote with both the applicant and intervener union 
on the ballot (i.e. requiring the second condition) captures all of the raid 
applications that progressed to a vote and it prevents the inclusion of appli-
cations where the intervener union is just an interested third party. Non-raid 
certification applications that involved more than one union would also have 
an intervener union and there would also be multiple unions on the ballots if 
a representation vote was held. But these non-raid cases would also have the 
option of ‘no union’ on the ballot. Thus they would violate the third condition 
and they are not counted (mistakenly) as raids. OLRB personnel confirm that 
this is the most accurate of available methods for identifying and isolating 
raids in the Ontario certification data (Stelmacszinski, 2003).
Raid applications that were withdrawn by the union before a 
 representation vote was held cannot be identified as raids using the method 
above, and so they are excluded from the data. All withdrawn  certification 
 applications are therefore excluded from the analysis that follows to 
keep the data  comparable.21 This exclusion does not affect the number of 
 applications granted or the number of employees covered by successful 
organizing  campaigns, but it does affect the number of applications disposed 
and success rates. There is, however, good reason for excluding the with-
drawn applications from both the raid and non-raid data, aside from data 
 availability problems. Many raid and non-raid applications are withdrawn 
for purely technical reasons (e.g. errors or omissions in the application) and 
then re-submitted in the same or next month. 
The raid and non-raid organizing data are shown in the table and figures 
below. All of the data (monthly, calendar year aggregates, or fiscal year 
aggregates) are available from the authors. 
21. Over the period 1985 to 2003, withdrawn certification applications accounted for roughly 
15% of all certification applications. 
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RAIDS IN ONTARIO
Table 1 shows the total number of raid applications granted and 
 dismissed by the OLRB, the number granted, and the number of  employees 
covered in raids granted, by calendar year, over the sample period. Table 
1 also shows the success rate for raid applications, which equals the 
 percentage of raid applications proceeding to a vote that were granted. The 
success rate for raids varies significantly from year to year, likely due to the 
small numbers of raid applications, and it is slightly lower than the success 
rate for non-raid certification applications when averaged over the whole 
sample period.22 However, the difference in success rates is not statistically 
significant at conventional confidence levels using a two sample t-test.
Table 1 shows extremely high levels of raiding activity in 2000 and 
2001. This huge increase occurred when eight large Canadian SEIU locals 
tried to become affiliated with the CAW. The locals were unable to switch to 
the CAW en masse, so the CAW proceeded to raid the individual bargaining 
units within the locals.23 The last two columns of Table 1 show the number 
of applications and the number of employees involved in those CAW raids 
of the SEIU. Since these raids actually represent just one extremely large 
raid, and since the large numbers involved skew the scale and analysis 
of the other raids, these CAW/SEIU cases are omitted from some of the 
analysis that follows. However, short descriptions of the results when those 
CAW/SEIU cases are included are reported below. 
Figure 1 shows the number of raid applications granted and dismissed, 
and the number granted, excluding the 2000/01 CAW/SEIU cases, for 
each month from April 1975 to November 2003. The small circle  markers 
 connected by grey lines show the actual number of raids granted each month. 
The thicker dark lines show smoothed values which average out the month 
to month variations.24 The year ticks on the horizontal axis mark January of 
22. The average (median) of the annual raid success rates, 1975–2003 is 72.0% (74.5%). 
The average (median) of the annual non-raid certification success rates, 1985–2003 is 
75.3% (76.9%). If the raid data are restricted to the years where annual certification 
data are available (1985–2003), the average (median) of the annual raid success rates 
is 73.8% (76.7%). Again, withdrawn applications are excluded from the data.
23. See, for example, Canadian Press Newswire, 2000, “Tug of war between CAW and 
SEIU shaking up house of labour.” Canadian Press Newswire, April 24 or Rennie, 
Gary, 2000, “CAW ranks to balloon; Service Employees International Union to join 
CAW – pending ratification vote.” The Windsor Star, February 21, p. A1. 
24. The smoothed series consist of the predicted values from locally weighted linear 
regressions of the number raids, regressed on time. A separate regression is run for 
each observation (i.e. number of raids in that month) using data from (roughly) one 
year before and one year after the month. Shorter, uncentered subsets of data are used 
for the beginning and ending observations in the data.
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that year. Note that the vertical distance between the two smoothed series 
does not change notably over the sample period. This confirms the data in 
Table 1 showing that the success rate for raid  applications did not change 
significantly over the period, although it was highly variable. 
Figure 2 shows the number of employees in the raid applications granted 
using the same horizontal axis and marking for the series. Both figures tell 
essentially the same story about raids in Ontario, which suggests that there 
has been no significant trend in the size of raided bargaining units. The 
most important result shown in Figures 1 and 2 is that, over most of the 
sample period, there have been only modest amounts of raiding in Ontario. 
Most months have five or fewer raid applications proceeding to a vote and 
the raids granted cover fewer than 200 employees. Further, the numbers of 
raids and employees covered are at or very close to zero in many months. 
The big exceptions, of course, are the CAW/SEIU raids in 2000 and 2001. 
If they were included, there would be extremely large spikes in all of the 
variables of both graphs over 2000 and 2001. 
Regression analysis on the data excluding the 2000/01 CAW/SEIU 
event shows that the number of raids granted and dismissed, the number 
granted, and the number of employees covered in raids granted all have 
negative trends that are small but statistically significant. Thus the amount 
of (non-CAW/SEIU) raiding has been declining slightly, on average, over 
the period of the sample. All of the relevant changes in labour legislation 
(i.e. Bill 40, Bill 7, and Bill 139) occur in the latter half of the sample, 
FIGURE 1
Number of Raid Applications,  no 2000/01 CAW/SEIU
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so dummy variables corresponding to those changes all take their values 
of one in the latter half of the sample. Thus, if the dummy variables for 
 legislation changes are included in regressions with no trend term, they all 
show negative (and almost always statistically significant) effects.25 We 
remain unconvinced, however, that the decrease in raiding activity is due to 
the specific changes in legislation and is not just part of an overall  declining
trend which goes back to the 1970s. If the legislation dummy variables 
are included with a trend term, all but one of the legislation coefficients 
switch sign (to positive) and most become statistically insignificant. The 
trend term in this case remains negative and significant (albeit at the 10% 
level in some specifications) in the numbers of applications equations, but 
negative and insignificant in the number of employees equation. 
FIGURE 2
Number of Employees in Raids Granted,  no 2000/01 CAW/SEIU
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25. The big exception is the dummy variable for the December 2000 changes (Bill 139) in 
the number of employees regression. In this case the estimated coefficient is negative 
but the estimated t-statistic is around -0.5. This is not surprising given the increase in 
the number of employees covered by raids in early 2002 shown in Figure 2. The other 
exception is the Bill 40 dummy variable in the number of raids granted regression. 
The estimated coefficient is negative but generally only significant at the 20% level in 
various specifications. 
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We also investigate whether the coordinated open periods in the 
 construction industry affect raiding activity. A dummy variable which 
equals one in the coordinated open periods and one or two of the subsequent 
months (to allow time for the applications to be processed by the OLRB) is 
included in the regression equations. A positive coefficient could represent 
an increase in raiding or just a change in the timing with the same number 
of raids now concentrated in the common open period. The interpretation is 
not an issue in this case, however, because the estimated effects in the open 
and subsequent months are consistently very small and very insignificant. 
The coordinated open periods in construction had no discernable effect on 
aggregate raiding levels. 
The regression results cited above (and below) are all very robust to 
different specifications, including variables for monthly changes in Ontario 
employment lagged up to three months, and monthly dummy variables.26
The actual numerical values of the estimates for the various regression 
specifications are not included for brevity and because the overall results 
are more easily summarized in words, but we are happy to provide them 
to interested readers.
If the 2000/01 CAW/SEIU cases are included, the results of the analysis 
change in the predictable ways. Again, the graphs of the number of raid 
applications and number of employees covered (i.e. the corresponding 
 versions of Figures 1 and 2) all have extremely high spikes in the years 
2000 and 2001 which dwarf all of the other variations in the data. Similarly, 
the regression analysis shows that raiding activity is generally ‘U’ shaped 
with no simple trend. The estimated coefficients on the dummy variables 
representing the November 1995 and December 2000 changes in legislation 
(Bill 7 and Bill 139) are much larger because both dummy variables cover 
part of the period of increased activity. In some specifications the estimated 
effect of the Bill 40 legislation is much smaller than with the CAW/SEIU 
cases excluded. This occurs because the 1993–95 period for Bill 40 is close 
to the middle of the sample and therefore close to the bottom of the ‘U’. But, 
overall, we do not feel that the regression analysis yields any meaningful 
results other than identifying the overall trends in the data. 
It is interesting to consider whether raiding has increased or decreased 
as a proportion of total organizing.27 Figure 3 shows the smoothed 
26. The regression analyses all use Newey-West standard errors that adjust for arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity and up to third order auto-correlation.
27. The quantitative analysis of raiding activity as a proportion of overall organizing 
 activity, and the inquiry into the impact of labour law upon these patterns, was  originally 
performed in an unpublished manuscript prepared by Timothy Bartkiw towards his 
doctoral dissertation. Much of the work in this paper builds upon material prepared in 
early drafts of a chapter of this doctoral dissertation. 
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 proportion of certification applications granted and dismissed that were 
raids and  similar series for applications granted and number of employees 
in  applications granted, all with the 2000/01 CAW/SEIU cases removed. 
Figure 3 reports a shorter time series because the monthly total certifica-
tion data only cover 1985 to 2003 and those data are required to calculate 
the proportion of raids. 
FIGURE 3
Raids as a Proportion of Certification Activity,  no 2000/01 CAW/SEIU
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Figure 3 confirms that the amount of raiding in Ontario has been quite 
modest over the period shown. Attempted and successful raids comprise 
roughly 5% of the total numbers of applications attempted and granted. 
Figure 3 also shows that the number of employees in raids accounted for 
about 10% of the number of employees in all certifications granted. This 
confirms Gilson and Spencer’s (1987) finding that raided bargaining units 
tend to be much larger than other certified units. The average bargaining 
unit size in each month (i.e. the number of employees covered divided by 
the number of certifications granted in that month) was calculated to obtain 
a numerical measure of the difference. Over the period of the sample, the 
median average monthly bargaining unit size is 34.2 employees for non-raid 
certifications granted and 59.2 employees for raids granted. The difference 
in the averages (over the sample) of the average monthly bargaining unit 
sizes is even larger (38.4 versus 90.7). The differences in the means and 
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medians are overwhelmingly statistically significant using a t-test and a non-
parametric 2-sample test for medians. Again, with the 2000/01 CAW/SEIU 
cases included, Figure 3 changes in the predictable way, showing very large 
spikes in all of the series for those years. 
Regression analysis shows that the proportions of raid applications 
 plotted in Figure 3 have small positive and statistically significant trends 
if no variables for legal changes are included. Thus, in simplest terms 
and  averaged over the whole period, raiding activity (as measured by 
 applications) has been decreasing (save the 2000/01 CAW/SEIU experience) 
but, as will be shown below, the amount of non-raid organizing has been 
decreasing more quickly so the proportion of raids has increased slightly. 
The smoothed series in Figure 3 also show that the proportion of 
raids started to decrease sharply after the election of the NDP government 
in September of 1990. Thus another dummy variable, representing the 
period of NDP governance before the passage of Bill 40, is included in the 
 regression analysis that follows to capture this effect. 
Table 2 shows regression results where the dependent variable is the 
ratio of raid to non-raid organizing activity and the 2000/2001 CAW/SEIU 
cases are excluded. The ratio, rather than the proportion of all organizing 
activity (as in Figure 3), is used to increase the variability of the dependent 
variable and, therefore, sharpen the regression results. Table 2 shows that 
raid applications did decrease (relative to non-raid applications) after the 
election of the NDP and the passage of Bill 40. The result is not statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level in any of the cases, but it is significant at 
the 10% level for the impact of the initial election of the NDP and for the 
number of applications granted. Examination of the data shows that the 
ratio dropped over the NDP period because the number of raid applications 
proceeding to a vote and granted dropped over 1991 and 1992, while the 
number of non-raid applications increased in the 1993 to mid 1995 period. 
The increase in non-raid organizing was likely aided by the extension of 
union representation rights to groups of employees who were previously 
excluded from organizing and the greater access to third party property for 
organizing given by Bill 40. 
According to Table 2, the passage of Bill 7 had no discernible effect 
on the ratio of raid to non-raid applications. Averaged over the November 
1995 to December 2000 period, both raid and non-raid organizing activity 
decreased compared to earlier years. Thus, the mandatory representation 
votes for non-raid applications imposed by Bill 7 did not cause a switch to 
more raiding activity which had always required the votes. Figure 3  suggests 
that there may have been a switch in the early part of the period but not in 
the latter part and not averaged over the whole sample. 
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The regression estimates in Table 2 show that the passage of Bill 139 
(January 2001) marked a statistically significant increase in the ratio of 
raid to non-raid organizing applications, even with the CAW/SEIU cases 
excluded. The increase in the length of the open period may have contrib-
uted since raiding activity did increase compared to the earlier period, but 
it is not the most important factor. The large increase in the ratio occurred 
mainly because of the very large drop in the levels of non-raid organising 
activity that occurred over this period. 
TABLE 2
Regression Results
Ratio of Raid to Non-Raid Organizing Activity
Dependent Variable is Ratio of Raid
to Non-Raid
Independent Variables
Granted and 
Dismissed
Applications
Granted
Applications
# of 
Employees
in Granted 
Applications
NDP government but no 
legislation
(Oct. 1990 to Dec. 1992)
(–0.020*
 (1.69)
(–0.024*
((1.85)
( 0.029
 (0.28)
Bill 40 
(Jan. 1993 to Oct. 1995)
(–0.011
 (1.30)
(–0.018*
 (1.92)
(–0.074
 (1.57)
Bill 7
(Nov. 1995 to Dec 2000)
( 0.008
 (0.90)
( 0.004
 (0.38)
( 0.054
 (0.44)
Bill 139
(Jan. 2001 to end of sample)
(0.025**
 (2.19)
( 0.025**
 (2.08)
( 0.075
 (0.81)
Construction industry open 
periods
(–0.008
 (0.83)
(–0.012
 (0.97)
(–0.033
 (0.41)
Constant ( 0.055**
 (3.12)
( 0.06**
 (2.87)
( 0.297*
 (1.75)
N 224 224 224
*  and  **  represent statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Absolute value of t-statistics calculated from Newey-West standard errors are shown in 
 parentheses.
Monthly dummy variables and the Ontario rate of change of employment for 1, 2, and 3 month 
lags were also included in the regressions, but are not reported here. The 2000/2001 CAW/SEIU 
cases are excluded.
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The proportion of employees covered in raids (excluding the 2000/01 
CAW/SEIU cases) is extremely variable over the sample period and the 
regression analysis yields no statistically significant inferences about its 
behaviour. In fact, the hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the non-
constant explanatory variables equal zero could not be rejected with an 
F-test in any of the specifications.
If the 2000/01 CAW/SEIU cases are included, then the results of the 
regression analysis change in the manner one would expect. There is a big 
increase in the proportions near the end of the sample so the upward trend 
in the ratio of raid to non-raid activity becomes stronger. The estimated 
coefficients on the dummy variables for Bill 7 and 139 become much larger, 
but none of the inferences are changed significantly.
NON-RAID ORGANIZING ACTIVITY 
Table 1 shows the number of non-raid certification applications 
granted and dismissed by the OLRB, the number of non-raid certification 
 applications granted, and the number of employees covered in those non-
raid certifications, annually, for the period January 1985 to November 2003. 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the monthly levels of union organizing in Ontario 
and the effects of raiding activity on the organizing data. The circle markers 
in Figure 4 show the actual number of non-raid certification applications 
granted and dismissed by the OLRB and the solid line shows smoothed 
values of that series. The short dashed line in Figure 4 shows the smoothed 
number of granted and dismissed certification applications when raids are 
included, including the 2000/01 CAW/SEIU cases. Figures 5 and 6 show 
the corresponding series for the number of certification applications granted 
and the number of employees covered in certifications granted. Again, the 
number of applications and the number of employees all show essentially 
the same results.28
Union organizing, by any of the measures, shows a strong downward 
trend over the period 1985 to 2003. The increase in organizing occurring 
with the NDP government and Bill 40 (1991–95) and the sharp decrease 
that followed with the PC government, Bill 7 and Bill 139 have been 
 identified in the literature and they are shown very clearly in Figures 4, 5, 
and 6.29 Regression analysis easily confirms that these effects are  statistically 
significant.
28. The zero number for March of 1996 in Figures 4, 5 and 6 occurs because the Ontario 
government employees were on strike and the OLRB disposed of no applications in 
that month.
29. See, for example, Martinello (2000) for a more detailed analysis of the changes in 
organizing activity from 1987 to 1998.
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FIGURE 4
Raids and Non-Raid Certification Applications: Granted plus Dismissed
FIGURE 5
Raid and Non-Raid Certifications Granted
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The graphs confirm that raiding activity was modest in Ontario over 
the period, with the important exception of the CAW takeover of the SEIU 
bargaining units in 2000 and 2001. The numbers of non-raid applications 
and employees track their total (raid and non-raid) counterparts fairly 
closely and show basically the same increases and decreases over all of the 
sample period except 2000 and 2001. Thus the combined raid and non-raid 
data should provide reasonably accurate inferences about changes in the 
levels and success of organizing directed at uncovered workers over that 
period. Inferences about the effects of organizing on union density should 
also be reasonably accurate since raid and non-raid organizing overstate 
new  organizing by only small amounts for most of the period. But for 2000 
and 2001, the combined raid and non-raid organizing data provide very 
misleading signals. The data show a major revival in all measures of union 
organizing, when the true levels continued to fall. Any analyses of new 
union organizing or its effects on union density must correct the published 
OLRB data for the raiding activity occurring in those years. 
CONCLUSION
This paper reports on raid and non-raid union organizing in Ontario. 
Unfortunately, data on raiding activity in Ontario is not published by the 
FIGURE 6
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OLRB (or any other source), so the published results of all certification 
applications and representation votes were examined to calculate the levels 
of raiding activity. We show that raiding, as measured by number of raid 
applications or the number of employees covered in raids granted, generally 
decreased over the 1975 to 2003 period, with the exception of very large 
increases in activity in 2000 and 2001. We also show that the bargaining 
units in raids granted are much larger than in non-raid certifications. 
Over most of the 1975 to 2003 period, the levels of raiding activity were 
quite modest. 2000 and 2001 is the major exception and raiding  activity 
was quite high in those years. When raids are measured as a proportion of 
total organizing, or as a ratio of raid to non-raid organizing, the same basic 
conclusion emerges. Excluding the 2000/2001 spike in activity, one finds 
that raiding’s share of total organizing was low but not constant over the 
period studied. Regression analysis shows that the ratio of raid to non-raid 
 certification applications decreased during Ontario’s NDP  government 
(roughly 1991 to 1995) and that it increased after the Progressive 
Conservative government’s Bill 139 (in late 2000), although some of these 
changes were statistically significant at only the 10% level. Averaged over 
the period of the sample, the ratio of raid to non-raid organizing activity 
increased over time. As noted above, raiding activity generally decreased 
over the sample but non-raid organizing decreased even more. 
Based on the data, we contend that analyses of organizing activity or 
success, and their implications for union coverage or density are unlikely 
to be affected greatly by including raids in the organizing data for  periods 
before 2000. Analyses that cover the 2000 to 2001 period, however, 
 cannot ignore the effects of raiding activity. The numbers of employees 
and  applications involved in the movement of a significant number of 
Canadian based SEIU locals to the CAW are very large compared to the 
levels of  organizing activity directed at unorganised workers. Thus total 
 organizing data  seriously overstate the amount of new union organizing and 
the data must be adjusted to avoid incorrect inferences about  organizing 
and its implications for union density. Once raid cases are removed, the 
data show clearly that union organizing in Ontario has continued to decline 
in recent years.
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RÉSUMÉ
Campagnes d’organisation syndicale et de maraudage 
en Ontario
Parfois des syndicats vont chercher à organiser des travailleurs qui sont 
déjà membres d’un autre syndicat. Cette activité, qu’on appelle maraudage, 
fait l’objet d’une controverse. Seulement deux juridictions canadiennes, le 
Fédéral et la Colombie-Britannique, publient de l’information sur ce sujet. 
Cet essai vient corriger cette lacune, du moins dans le cas de l’Ontario, en 
mettant au point une façon d’identifier les cas de maraudage en se basant sur 
les données de la Commission des relations du travail de l’Ontario (CRTO). 
Nous rendons compte d’un nombre de campagnes qui ont donné lieu à 
un vote de représentation, du nombre accueilli, et du nombre de salariés 
 couverts au cours de la période d’avril 1975 à novembre 2003.
Des études antérieures d’organisation syndicale (ex., Martinello, 2000; 
Johnson (2002a, 2002b) utilisent des données publiées par la CRTO, qui 
incluent des tentatives de maraudage et qui surévaluent par conséquent 
le nombre de nouvelles campagnes et la venue des travailleurs sous la 
bannière syndicale. Pour contrer ce problème, nous avons soustrait les 
nouvelles observations de l’activité de maraudage des données publiées sur 
l’accréditation et nous n’avons ainsi retenu que les niveaux d’activité de 
maraudage impliquant seulement les nouveaux travailleurs. On y décrit aussi 
la législation qui encadre le maraudage et nous l’utilisons comme une base 
dans une simple analyse des niveaux absolus et relatifs du maraudage.
Le nombre de tentatives de maraudage qui ont donné lieu à un vote, le 
succès obtenu et le nombre de salariés impliqués sont présentés au tableau 
1 et aux figures 1 et 2. Les niveaux d’activité de maraudage et leur succès 
sont modestes et déclinent légèrement à travers l’échantillon, sauf une 
exception importante : l’explosion de cette activité au cours des années 
2000 et 2001, attribuable aux Travailleurs canadiens de l’automobile 
(TCA) qui ont accaparé plusieurs unités locales de l’Union internationale 
des employés de service (UIES). Puisque les maraudages de la TCA-UIES 
ne représentent actuellement qu’un seul maraudage extrêmement vaste et 
puisque les grands nombres impliqués infléchissent l’échelle et l’analyse 
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des autres maraudages, ces cas TCA-UIES sont retirés de quelques tableaux 
et de l’analyse. L’analyse a été complètement reprise avec les cas TCA-
UIES inclus et alors les résultats empruntent des directions prévisibles. 
Par exemple, quand les cas TCA-UIES sont inclus dans les figures 1 et 2, 
des pointes très larges apparaissent dans toutes les variables au cours des 
années 2000 et 2001.
L’analyse de régression confirme la tendance à la baise de l’activité 
de maraudage au cours de la période de l’échantillon (en excluant les cas 
TCA-UIES) et nous en venons à la conclusion que les modifications à la 
législation du travail, la coordination des conventions dans l’industrie de 
la construction, les effets particuliers du mois et le cycle économique ont 
peu d’effet sur l’ensemble de l’activité de maraudage.
Les données de la figure 3 confirment le fait que les niveaux d’activité 
de maraudage sont aussi modestes quand on les mesure en retenant leur part 
de l’activité d’organisation syndicale dans son ensemble. Les maraudages 
tentés et suivis d’un succès comptent pour approximativement 5 % des ten-
tatives, alors que le nombre des salariés dans les maraudages est de l’ordre 
de 10 % de tous les salariés impliqués dans les accréditations accordées. Les 
unités d’accréditation qui ont fait l’objet d’un maraudage apparaissent beau-
coup plus vastes que les autres unités accréditées. L’analyse de régression 
montre que les proportions des tentatives de maraudage répertoriées dans 
la figure 3 présentent des tendances positives minimes, mais significatives, 
lorsqu’on exclut les variables relatives aux modifications de la législation. 
Alors, présentée dans des termes simples faisant état de moyennes au cours 
de la période, l’activité de maraudage a diminué, sauf les cas TCA-UIES 
en 2000-2001. Cependant, le nombre de tentatives d’organisation syndicale 
sans égard au maraudage a décru d’une façon plus rapide, de sorte que la 
proportion des maraudages s’est accrue légèrement.
L’analyse de régression du rapport des tentatives de maraudage sur 
celles de l’organisation syndicale sans recourir au maraudage reproduite 
au tableau 2 démontre que les tentatives de maraudage ont diminué (en 
relation avec les tentatives d’organisation sans maraudage); cela après 
l’élection du NPD et l’adoption du projet de loi 40. Le résultat n’apparaît 
pas statistiquement significatif à un seuil de 5 %, mais il s’y rapproche. 
Les données démontrent que le rapport a chuté parce que le nombre de 
tentatives de maraudage donnant lieu à un vote avec succès au cours de 
la période 1991-1992 a diminué. Le nombre de tentatives d’organisation 
syndicale sans recours au maraudage a augmenté considérablement au cours 
de la période 1993-1995. L’augmentation de ces activités d’organisation 
est probablement due à l’extension des droits de représentation syndicale 
aux salariés auparavant exclus de ces activités et l’accès plus facile à un 
tiers au cours d’une activité d’organisation syndicale sous l’égide du projet 
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de loi 40. L’adoption du projet de loi 7 à la fin de l’année 1995 n’a pas eu 
d’effet perceptible sur le rapport maraudage non-maraudage. En établissant 
une moyenne pour la période allant de novembre 1995 à décembre 2000, 
les deux types d’activité d’organisation ont diminué en nombre lorsqu’on 
les compare à celles des années antérieures. Alors, les votes obligatoires 
de représentation pour les tentatives d’organisation sans maraudage, en 
vertu du projet de loi 7, n’ont pas causé de glissement vers plus d’activités 
de maraudage qui elles ont toujours fait l’objet de votes exigés. La figure 
3 laisse peut-être apparaître un glissement au cours de la première partie 
de la période, mais pas dans la dernière, non plus pour la moyenne de la 
période. Le tableau 2 montre aussi que l’adoption du projet de loi 139 (en 
janvier 2001) a été suivie par une augmentation statistiquement significative 
du rapport des activités de maraudage sur les activités d’organisation sans 
maraudage, même quand on exclut les cas TCA-UIES. L’augmentation 
s’est produite en grande partie à cause du déclin remarquable des activités 
d’organisation sans recours au maraudage.
Les figures 4, 5 et 6 font état du total des activités d’organisation de 
maraudage et de non-maraudage au cours des années 1985-2003. Encore 
là, les données montrent de petites quantités d’activités de maraudage au 
cours de la plupart des années, de sorte que nous pouvons prétendre que 
les études sur les activités d’organisation syndicale et leur succès, leur effet 
sur la densité syndicale, ne seront pas influencées de façon considérable si 
on inclut dans les données celles qui ont trait au maraudage. Une exception 
importante, cependant, se présente au cours des années 2000-2001, où les 
données totales sur les accréditations surestiment les nouvelles activités 
d’organisation syndicale et elles doivent être corrigées pour éviter des 
conclusions qui ne seraient pas justes au sujet des tentatives d’organisation 
syndicale et leur effet sur la densité syndicale. Lorsque les cas de marau-
dage sont retirés, les données montrent de façon évidente que l’activité 
d’organisation syndicale en Ontario a continué à décliner au cours des 
dernières années.
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